Sandler v. Coger

Facts

On May 10, 2016, James Coger was stopped at an intersection when Mary Elizabeth Sandler rear-ended his vehicle. The impact caused Coger’s body to jerk forward and was described as feeling “like hitting a wall that you didn’t know was there.” The force of the crash lodged Coger’s tow bar into Sandler’s vehicle.

Coger had previously been in a 2009 car wreck, which caused injuries to his neck and back, including a herniated disc. However, by the time of the 2016 crash, the evidence showed he had fully recovered and was no longer experiencing pain. Immediately after the 2016 crash, Coger reported experiencing neck and back pain and sought medical treatment the following day.

An MRI scan revealed that Coger had new disc herniations in different parts of his spine, as well as a disc tear or fissure that had not been present after the 2009 crash. Over the next several months, Coger underwent chiropractic treatment, epidural steroid injections, and physical therapy, and he was prescribed a back brace, anti-inflammatory medication, and muscle relaxants. Although he initially experienced significant relief, his pain later returned, requiring additional treatment over the following years.

Coger filed a lawsuit against Sandler, the defendant, seeking damages for the injuries Cogersustained in the 2016 crash. The defendant stipulated to negligence but argued that the crash did not cause Coger’s injuries, asserting that his back pain could have been caused by prolonged sitting at his desk job rather than the accident.

At trial, Coger introduced medical testimony to establish that the crash caused his injuries, including a videotaped deposition from Dr. Francis Acquah, who treated Coger after the crash. Dr. Acquah testified that the crash caused new injuries and aggravated his preexisting condition.

The defendant’s attorney, in cross-examining Dr. Acquah, referenced a blog post from AICA (Accident Injury Centers of Atlanta), where Dr. Acquah worked. The defense lawyer asked on cross-examination, “on AICA’s own blog it states, quote, in fact, most back pain is caused by frequently sitting for long periods, correct?”

The defendant did not call any witnesses and did not formally introduce any evidence.

Based on the defense lawyer’s quotation of the blog article during Dr. Acquah’s cross-examination, the trial court concluded that the defendant had introduced evidence and lost the ability to open and conclude argument.

In charging the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that it could conclude that a causal connection existed between the crash and the onset of symptoms and receipt of treatment, but that it was solely up to the jury whether to draw such a conclusion. The trial court further instructed the jury that the plaintiff could identify his own medical bills and did not have to introduce expert testimony to prove that the charges were reasonable and necessary, but that it was solely up to the jury to decide if the medical bills were reasonable and necessary.

The jury found in Coger’s favor, awarding him $451,167.67 in damages. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court (1) erred in refusing to allow her to open and close final arguments, (2) improperly instructed the jury on causation, and (3) gave an incorrect instruction regarding medical damages.

Issues & Holdings

1. Did the trial court err by denying Sandler the right to open and close final arguments?

Holding: No. The Court of Appeals held that Sandler introduced evidence by quoting a blog post during cross-examination, which forfeited her right to open and close.

2. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on causation?

Holding: No. The Court of Appeals held that the jury charge—allowing the jury to infer causation from a short lapse of time between an accident and symptoms—was legally correct and supported by the evidence.

3. Did the trial court mislead the jury regarding medical damages?

Holding: No. The Court of Appeals found that the jury instruction correctly stated the law, allowing Coger to introduce medical bills without expert testimony while preserving Sandler’s right to challenge their reasonableness.

Reasoning

Right to Open and Close Final Arguments

The standard for determining when questioning a witness about a statement constitutes the introduction of evidence depends on whether the statement is being used solely for impeachment or whether it is being used to introduce substantive evidence. 

Under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-186, a defendant retains the right to open and close final arguments if they introduce no evidence. As there was a lack of case law interpreting this statute, the Court of Appeals looked to cases citing former O.C.G.A. § 17-8-71, which had an identical provision for criminal cases.

The Court of Appeals examined the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. State, 272 Ga. 874 (2000). In Smith, the Supreme Court cited the standards for when a defendant introduces evidence:

1. If a defendant reads from a prior statement that is not related to impeachment, they introduce evidence and lose the right to open and close arguments.
2. If a defendant reads only portions of a statement directly relevant to impeaching the witness, they do not introduce evidence.
3. If a defendant voluntarily introduces a prior inconsistent statement into evidence, they introduce evidence and lose the right to open and close.

The Court of Appeals discussed several prior criminal cases that discussed these standards. For example, in Lane v. State, 274 Ga. 751 (2002), the defendant did not introduce evidence when a witness read a prior statement to show a discrepancy in testimony. This was deemed proper impeachment. Likewise, in Davis v. State, 235 Ga. App. 256 (1998), reading a prior inconsistent statement to a witness for impeachment purposes was foundational and did not constitute introducing evidence.

On the other hand, in Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400 (1996), it was held that a defendant introduced evidence by playing a witness’s recorded statement for the jury, even though the recording was not formally admitted into evidence. Similarly, in Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga. App. 209 (1999), the defendant introduced evidence by having witnesses read portions of their prior statements, going beyond mere impeachment. 

In addition, in McFarlin v. State, 259 Ga. App. 838 (2003), it was held that defendants introduced evidence by having a physician read from medical reports to present substantive evidence, which went beyond impeachment. 

In this case, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant introduced evidence when her attorney read verbatim from an AICA blog post during the cross examination of Dr. Acquah. Unlike in Lane and Davis, where prior statements were used solely to highlight inconsistencies in testimony, defense counsel used the blog post to challenge causation opinions and support defendant’s own causation theory, rather than impeach a prior inconsistent statement by the witness. Indeed, Dr. Acquah had admitted that prolonged sitting could cause back pain before defense counsel proceeded to quote the blog post. In addition, Dr. Acquah did not author the blog post, so it was not even a prior statement by him. 

As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that reading from the blog post amounted to introducing evidence, even though it was not officially admitted. Accordingly, the defendant lost the right to open and close final arguments.

Jury Instruction on Causation

Defendant challenged the jury instruction on causation, which stated that a jury may infer a causal connection between an accident and an injury when symptoms appear shortly after the crash. Sandler argued that:

1. The instruction was not supported by the facts, as Coger did not report an injury at the scene.
2. The instruction improperly suggested causation, relieving Coger of his burden of proof.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the instruction was a correct statement of Georgia law, particularly in vehicle collision cases, where a jury may infer causation based on proximity in time between an accident and onset of symptoms. The evidence supported the charge, as Coger reported pain the day after the crash, sought immediate treatment, and continued experiencing symptoms over time. In addition, the jury was explicitly told that they—not the court—must decide whether to infer causation, preserving the defendant’s ability to challenge the evidence.

Because the charge was legally accurate and factually supported, the Court of Appeals found no error.

Jury Instruction on Medical Damages

Sandler also challenged the instruction that a plaintiff may introduce medical bills without expert testimony that they were reasonable and necessary. She argued that:

1. The instruction misled the jury into believing Coger had met his burden of proof on damages.
2. It improperly limited the defense’s ability to challenge the reasonableness of the bills.

The Court of Appeals disagreed. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-921 expressly states that a patient can identify medical bills without requiring expert testimony that they are reasonable and necessary. The trial court’s instruction did not prevent the defendant from disputing the charges—it merely allowed Coger to introduce the bills without an additional expert witness. The instruction also reminded the jury that they—not the court—must determine whether the charges were reasonable and necessary.

Thus, the jury instruction accurately stated the law, and the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof.

Conclusion

This is an important case to know for any lawyer who tries personal injury cases.

First, the case sets the standard for when a defense lawyer introduces evidence and loses the right to open and conclude argument. In many cases, defense counsel will try to steal closing argument by not introducing evidence. Nevertheless, defense counsel will come close to the line, if not cross it, in cross-examining the plaintiff, medical providers, and other witnesses. This may include reading from medical records, prior statements, or medical articles. 

This case should limit the ability of defendants to enter evidence through cross-examination if they want the right to have the final argument. And if the standards set forth in this case are violated, plaintiff’s counsel should be prepared to bring the issue to the court’s attention and cite this case.

Second, this case reinforces the long-standing rule that a jury can infer causation if there’s a temporal relationship between the injury and the onset of symptoms. This case further establishes that it is appropriate for the trial court to instruct the jury on this principle.

Third, the case establishes that it is appropriate to instruct the jury on the statute for the identification and authentication of medical expenses, and that under the law expert testimony is not required. 

Citation: Sandler v. Coger, No. A24A0968 (Ga. Ct. App. October 29, 2024)