Edwards v. Higgins

Facts

In 2018, Cindy Higgins struck Dishawn Edwards’s car in a parking lot. Edwards offered to settle for $12,500 pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68. Higgins’s insurer counteroffered at $250. 

After four years and a three-day trial, the jury awarded Edwards $17,000. Edwards then moved for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, requesting $165,165 based on her attorneys’ hourly billing rates and hours worked. The trial court awarded $6,800, relying solely on Edwards’s contingency fee agreement, which calculated 40% of the judgment. Edwards appealed, arguing the trial court improperly limited the award.

Issue & Holding

The issue in this case was: Did the trial court err by calculating the attorney fees award based solely on the contingency fee agreement?

Holding: Yes. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded the case, finding that attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 must consider the reasonable value of professional services rendered, not just the contingency fee.

Reasoning

Under OCGA § 9-11-68, plaintiffs can recover attorney fees when they achieve a judgment exceeding 125% of a rejected settlement offer. The trial court must determine fees based on the reasonable value of services rendered, supported by evidence such as hours worked, billing rates, and the complexity of the case.

The Court of Appeals cited Georgia Department of Corrections v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469 (2014), which emphasized that contingency fee agreements, while relevant, should not be the sole basis for fee calculation. Instead, trial courts must evaluate evidence of the actual work performed. 

Here, Edwards provided evidence of her attorneys’ hours and billing rates, which the trial court acknowledged but disregarded in favor of the contingency fee amount. 

The Court of Appeals noted that while a 40% contingency fee agreement may be standard for this type of case, it does not mean that the amount generated by the agreement fairly reflects the value of the attorney’s services. Citing Couch, the Court of Appeals concluded, “a contingency fee agreement ‘is a gamble for both the lawyer and the client, because the value of the professional services actually rendered by the lawyer may be considerably higher or lower than the agreed-upon amount, depending on how the litigation proceeds.’”

The Court of Appeals also reasoned that § 9-11-68 is properly understood as a sanction that requires the misbehaving party to pay the opposing party’s resulting fees and litigation expenses. That purpose would be thwarted if the contingency fee lawyer was prevented from recovering all fees and expenses resulting from the opposing party’s abuse. 

Conclusion

The decision reinforces the principle that attorney fee awards under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 must reflect the actual value of services rendered rather than arbitrary limitations tied to contingency agreements or case outcomes. For attorneys, this ruling underscores the importance of presenting detailed evidence of time, billing rates, and case complexity when seeking fees under the statute.

The remand instructs trial courts to evaluate whether hours and rates claimed are reasonable and proportionate to the work performed, avoiding arbitrary reliance on contingency agreements. This decision also warns defendants that undervaluing cases during settlement negotiations can result in significant financial consequences, incentivizing careful evaluation of offers.

Citation: Edwards v. Higgins, No. A24A0989 (Ga. Ct. App. October 31, 2024)