AU Medical Center v. Dale

Court of Appeals Holds That Former OCGA § 51-12-33(b) Does Not Permit Apportionment When Only One Defendant Remains at Trial, Even if Multiple Defendants Were Originally Named

Facts

In July 2017, John Dale visited AU Medical Center (AUMC) with breathing difficulties and was admitted for in-patient care. Despite showing signs of worsening infection, he was discharged on July 14. Early the next morning, his condition deteriorated significantly, requiring emergency transport back to the hospital. Tragically, Mr. Dale passed away before his wife Dorothy could arrive at the hospital.

Dorothy Dale, as executor of her husband’s estate, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against multiple defendants including AUMC, AU Health System, MCG Health System, AU Medical Associates, Dr. Michael Sumner, and the Board of Regents. Through a series of voluntary dismissals and withdrawals, AUMC became the sole remaining defendant facing medical malpractice and vicarious liability claims at trial.

After the trial court held that former O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) did not permit apportionment at trial as the case was proceeding to trial against a single defendant.

Issue & Holding

The central issue was whether language in Georgia’s former apportionment statute (OCGA § 51-12-33(b)) applies to cases that were initially filed against multiple defendants but proceed to trial against only one remaining defendant. This turned on interpreting the statutory language “where an action is brought against more than one person.”

The Court of Appeals held that the apportionment statute does not apply when only one defendant remains at trial, even if multiple defendants were originally named. The Court determined that “is brought” refers to the state of the case at trial, not when initially filed.

Reasoning

The Court’s analysis focused heavily on statutory interpretation principles and precedent. The majority emphasized that statutes must be read in their most natural and reasonable way, viewing the text in full context rather than isolating specific words.

The Court found particularly persuasive the present tense use of “is brought” in the statute, interpreting this to mean the current state of the action at trial rather than its historical filing status. The majority reasoned that if the legislature had intended the statute to apply based on initial filing, it could have used past tense language like “was brought.”

The Court also relied heavily on precedent from cases like Carmichael I and Alston & Bird, which had addressed similar questions about when apportionment applies. While none directly resolved the precise issue here, they collectively suggested that apportionment’s availability should be determined based on the current state of the case rather than its initial filing posture.

Conclusion

This decision has significant practical implications for Georgia civil litigation:

  1. Defendants who become the sole remaining party in a case originally filed against multiple defendants cannot seek apportionment of damages to former defendants or non-parties under the 2005 version of the statute if former O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) governs the action.
  2. However, such defendants are not without remedy – they retain the right to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties through separate actions.
  3. The ruling may influence strategic decisions about when to settle or dismiss claims against co-defendants, knowing that doing so could affect the remaining defendant’s ability to seek apportionment.
  4. The legislature’s 2022 amendment to OCGA § 51-12-33(b), changing “more than one person” to “one or more persons,” means this decision will not have applicability to newly filed cases, but it will be a significant decision to cases that were filed when the old apportionment statute was in effect.

This case demonstrates the ongoing evolution of Georgia tort law as courts continue to refine the interpretation and application of tort reform measures like apportionment of damages. It also illustrates how seemingly technical questions of statutory interpretation can have profound practical effects on civil litigation strategy and outcomes.

Citation: AU Medical Center, Inc. v. Dorothy Dale, As Executor of the Estate of John Dale, A24A1027 (Ga. Ct. App. November 1, 2024)

About the Author

Darl Champion is an award-winning personal injury lawyer serving the greater Metro Atlanta area. He is passionate about ensuring his clients are fully compensated when they are harmed by someone’s negligence. Learn more about Darl here.